Almost all widely distributed movies are either capitalist fantasies or aristocratic fantasies.
The universe runs on causality, not morality. Explaining the cause of an event and assigning moral blame are different, often opposed, activities.
What matters more: social oppression or personal virtue?
Just finished reading Marx, Marginalism, and Modern Sociology by Simon Clarke (MacMillan, 1982). It’s flawed but interesting.
Radical sinks draw energies from unequal social relations without changing those relations. They give rise to extrinsic motivations for radical action. Radical praxis draws energies from unequal social relations and uses it transformatively. It involves motivations intrinsic to radical projects.
We can define radicalism not by its conspicuous oppositionalism or militancy, but by its effort to intentionally transform social systems. The radical Left is a loose constellation of attempts to achieve maximal human freedom and equality through intentional social-systemic transformation. Any process which draws energy from that trajectory without returning it can be considered in terms analogous to a thermodynamic sink.
Single-dialectic thinking, despite its merits, has limitations which give rise to some self-defeating intellectual habits. Tangled-systems thinking could overcome those limitations.
Single-dialectic thinking has limitations which explain why radicals have a tendency to antagonize their allies and to fight amongst themselves, splitting into subfactions and trashing the insufficiently pure. This is not just pettiness or zealotry. There is a real epistemic problem at work.
Pessimistic visions of feminism as a permanent resistance to an intractable patriarchy are distressingly common. We need a different kind of intellectual production than we’ve had so far.
Liberal or libertarian social theories employing an MI strategy and counterhegemonic theories employing a dialectical strategy cannot be synthesized and cannot even really debate each other, at least not in strictly rational terms. Each side depends on fundamental assumptions which appear ludicrous or just plain stupid to the other side.
If we treat “truth” as a form of social practice, then epistemic strategies have implications for the social structure of truth.